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Evidence shows that market participants value analysts’ target prices. There is limited 
evidence, however, on how target price revisions influence investors’ decisions. I examine 
whether analyst ranking status affects institutional investors’ decisions to incorporate target 
price information into their investment strategies. This examination is relevant to the 
economic question: Does analyst reputation mitigate or exacerbate the conflicts of interest 
that analysts face? Consistent with institutional investor trades being based on superior 
information, I observe differences in the information content of target price revisions by star 
and non-star analysts. Additionally, a duration analysis shows that low target price quality 
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1. Introduction 
A well-established result in the literature is that analyst coverage affects a stock’s 
marketability. High quality analyst reports improve a company’s information environment 
and provide assurance to investors that analyst research outputs are credible. Investor 
confidence in analyst reports translates into potential rewards to analysts in their career 
development. Most importantly, institutional investors scrutinize analyst research and assess 
its value to produce an analyst ranking, an indicator of equity research quality. It is not 
surprising then that analysts are conscious of how their forecast disclosures affect their 
reputations. However, there is a limited understanding in the literature of whether the market 
appreciates analyst target prices and whether institutional investors pay attention to analyst 
target prices, the equity research output most comparable to market prices. Bradshaw et al. 
(2012) argue that sophisticated investors do not trust the credibility of analyst target prices. 
They find no evidence of differential target price forecasting ability among analysts and 
conclude that analysts have weak incentives to forecast accurate target prices because their 
target price revisions are not subject to market scrutiny. They argue that inaccurate target 
price forecasts are unlikely to jeopardize analyst reputation and compensation.  They further 
argue that target price accuracy is not systematically tracked by the analyst firms or their 
clients. On the other hand, earnings forecast and recommendation metrics are tracked by 
various companies provide periodical raking of analysts on the accuracy of those metrics. 
However, the lack of tangible evidence on target prices being tracked does not necessarily 
imply that target price performance is not being assessed and consequently that target prices 
are not useful to investors. The examination of Bradshaw et al. (2012) does not distinguish 
between star and non-star analyst target price revisions. It is, therefore, inconclusive whether 
or not analyst target price revisions are credible and useful to investors.  
A number of distortions can bias the objectivity of analyst target prices and other analyst 
forecasts. Examples of distortions include analysts herding on the consensus to build and 
preserve reputation (Hong et al., 2000), biasing forecasts upward to stay well-connected with 
corporate clients and gain access to information (Lim, 2001), and biasing forecasts to generate 
underwriting and brokerage business for investment banks. Yet, the literature documents that 
analyst target prices are an important source of information to market participants. Brav and 
Lehavy (2003) and Asquith et al. (2005) find significant market responses to analyst target 
prices. Asquith et al. (2005) show that the price response to a target price revision is higher 
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and more persistent than the response to an equal percentage EPS forecast revision. Using 
Italian data, Bianchini et al. (2008) develop investment portfolio strategies based on analyst 
target price forecasts and show that they generate significant positive abnormal returns, with 
the source of this profitability being the strong positive relation between target price implied 
returns and the portfolio return. As there is no consensus in the literature on whether analyst 
target prices are only sales hype, I delve more deeply into the phenomenon. Specifically, I 
examine whether analyst ranking affects the role of target prices in informing the investment 
decisions of the most sophisticated investors, namely institutional investors. Additionally, I 
examine whether target price quality affects institutional investors decisions to vote analysts 
‘star’. 
This study is the first to explore empirically the effect of analyst ranking on how informative 
target prices are to institutional investors. This investigation is important for two main 
reasons. First, the analysis informs our general understanding of the role of target prices, by 
exploring whether target prices are aimed at sophisticated investors. Institutional investors 
play a key role in capital markets and their information acquisition preferences directly affect 
stock price efficiency. For example, if they value the target price revisions of star analysts, the 
most visible analysts in the market, then target prices of star analysts play an important role in 
determining stock prices. Early evidence documents that institutional investors trade in the 
direction of analyst stock recommendations (He et al., 2005; Chen and Cheng, 2006; 
Oppenheimer and Sun, 2009). Lin and Tan (2011) report evidence of target price forecasts 
providing institutional investors with information not already reflected in other analyst 
forecasts and prevailing market prices. They find that consensus target price revisions have 
explanatory power for changes in institutional ownership incremental to changes in EPS and 
recommendation forecasts and after controlling for other factors determining institutional 
trading preferences. This is consistent with previous results in the literature that target prices 
contain information beyond that in stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. However, 
Lin and Tan (2011) draw inferences about changes in institutional ownership using changes in 
the consensus target price and their approach assumes that institutional investors do not 
distinguish revisions that provide new information from revisions that merely move toward 
the consensus. The second reason this study is important is that it is relevant for the debate on 
whether analyst reputation mitigates or exacerbates the conflicts of interest that analysts face. 
If star analysts are more informative than other analysts when revising their target prices then 
we should observe significant changes in institutional ownership associated with revisions by 
 4 
these analysts. Moreover, if target price quality matters to institutional investors, analysts with 
lower target price quality should be prone to higher risks of losing their star status. The 
findings therefore contribute to the analyst forecasting literature concerned with analyst 
conflicts of interest and their implications for the quality of their equity research.  
To examine whether institutional investor responses to the information in target price 
revisions depends on analyst ranking, I define analyst star status based on the Institutional 
Investor annual star ranking. Analyst star ranking is a highly regarded designation in the 
capital market. Every spring, the Institutional Investor magazine sends out surveys to 
institutional investors such as portfolio managers, research directors, and chief investment 
officers of the world’s largest pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds, asking them to 
rank analysts in each industry sector based on any criteria they see fit. Star analysts typically 
have higher public recognition, more experience, work for larger brokerage houses, cover 
larger stocks, and make more frequent revisions (Leone and Wu, 2007; Emery and Li, 2009). 
Institutional Investor weights the votes for each analyst by the size of the investor (the 
amount of money under management) and publishes the assigned All-America Research 
Team ranks every year in its October issue. Analysts and brokerage houses value this ranking 
highly. For analysts, a star ranking normally maps into career prospects. As new stars become 
visible, other banks try to attract them with high salaries (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Hong et al., 
2000). For investment banks, the number of star analysts in their research departments adds to 
the bank’s prestige and attracts more underwriting business (Irvine, 2004; Cowen et al., 2006; 
Jackson, 2005). It also attracts more brokerage business since institutional investors allocate 
their trading commissions among brokerage firms according to which analysts provide more 
informative research (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).  
Analyst star ranking is not only a key ingredient of analyst career success but also a 
significant determinant of the value of analyst opinion in the market. Research by Stickel 
(1992), Park and Stice (2000), and Jackson (2005) suggests that high reputation analysts have 
a greater impact on investors’ decisions. Additionally, star analysts issue more accurate EPS 
forecasts than non-star analysts and their recommendations generate larger returns (Stickel, 
1992; Desai et al., 2000; Leone and Wu, 2007; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Clarke et al., 2010; 
Fang and Yasuda, 2010). Jackson (2005) and Fang and Yasuda (2009) find evidence of 
analyst reputation being effective in reducing the conflicts of interest analysts face. On the 
other hand, Clarke et al. (2010) report that institutional investor reaction is more significant to 
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downgrades by star analysts than by non-star analysts. They find that institutional investors 
trade in the direction of upgrade recommendations only when they differ from the consensus 
and they find no significant evidence that institutional investors pay attention to upgrade 
recommendations by star analysts. Their results suggest that institutional investors are more 
likely to follow recommendations by star analysts only when the recommendations are 
negative. Moreover, analyst ranking status comes not only from forecast quality but also from 
building and maintaining strong ties with institutional investors and company management. 
An analyst’s job is more complex and personal than simply writing reports and rating stocks. 
Sell-side analysts have to market themselves and their research to institutional investors. To 
enhance their ranking status, analysts regularly communicate with institutional clients and 
respond quickly to their queries. If they don’t, analysts reduce the chance of their names 
appearing in the Institutional Investor survey sheet. Emery and Li (2009) report that analyst 
visibility dominates forecast accuracy in determining an analyst’s chances of being ranked a 
star. Gleason and Lee (2003) find that investors do not make a sufficient distinction between 
analyst revisions that bring new information to the market and those that herd on the 
consensus. Bonner et al. (2007) show that investor familiarity with analysts’ names rather 
than their superior performance is more influential in determining market reaction. Yet, the 
evidence on the effect of analyst reputation on the quality and usefulness of their research 
output is limited to EPS forecasts and stock recommendations.    
Consistent with institutional investors trading on superior information, I expect to observe 
differences in the value of information conveyed by target price revisions of star and non-star 
analysts. In choosing an appropriate research design to test how informative target prices are 
to institutional investors, it is important to note that analyst forecast revisions affect 
institutional investor behavior because the information they supply influences institutional 
investment decisions and institutional investors also affect analyst behavior by influencing 
analyst coverage decisions (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Ackert and Athanassakos, 2003). In 
the presence of endogeneity, arising from this simultaneity, OLS estimation is biased and 
inconsistent. I therefore use a research design that combines duration analysis with 
Heckman’s two-stage model to control for analyst differential target price revision selection 
and to assess the impact of target price revisions by star and non-star analysts on the change 
in institutional ownership. I conduct this analysis using a sample of analyst reports covering 
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US stocks during 2000‒2009.3 The evidence I present shows that analyst behavior and target 
price disclosure decisions are sensitive to analyst reputation, and by implication, to investor 
perceptions of the quality of equity research. 
The analysis shows that the impact of target price revisions on the change in institutional 
ownership is significant. I also find significant differences in the relationship between 
institutional ownership changes and target price revisions by star and non-star analysts. I find 
that institutional investors generally respond positively to target price revisions by star 
analysts while the association between institutional ownership changes and target price 
revisions by non-star analysts is significantly negative. The results imply that institutional 
investors find target price revisions by star analysts informative. This also suggests that it is 
important to control for analyst ranking status when examining the information content of 
target prices to institutional investors. To further validate the findings, I conduct a duration 
analysis to examine the effect of analyst target price quality on the likelihood of a star analyst 
losing star status. I find that target price quality significantly influences the likelihood of 
analysts losing their star status (i.e., institutional investors penalize analysts for low target 
price quality).  
The findings in this study have important implications for the analyst literature. I highlight the 
importance of adjusting for analyst heterogeneity when examining the information content of 
analyst target prices. The previous literature examining the relationship between institutional 
ownership and analyst forecasts aggregates analyst forecasts and examines the relation 
between institutional behavior and the information content of the consensus forecast. I 
decompose the forecast consensus by analyst star status to control for analyst incentives. 
Additionally, the paper adds, in a broader sense, to the literature concerned with the economic 
importance of analyst reputation. The results have important implications for analysts as they 
show that the quality of their target prices influences career outcomes. The findings are 
important to investors because they show that investors can increase their confidence in the 
quality of star analyst target prices.  
2. Research hypotheses   
                                                          
3
 Results are not sensitive to adding observations from the year 1999, the first year target price data are available 
on I/B/E/S.  I exclude those observations from the main analysis because the number of target price observations 
in 1999 is very small relative to other years in the sample.  
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The literature studying the link between analyst and institutional behavior documents that 
institutional investors find analyst stock recommendation revisions informative (Chen and 
Cheng, 2006; Oppenheimer and Sun, 2009). This literature also finds that institutional 
investors distinguish between recommendation revisions issued by star and non-star analysts. 
Clarke et al. (2010) use daily institutional ownership levels to examine the reaction of 
institutional investors to analyst recommendations conditional on the quality of the 
recommendation. They find a significant relationship between changes in institutional 
ownership and analyst reputation. Their finding is consistent with the literature studying 
analysts’ communication and information gathering behavior that highlights the importance of 
controlling for analyst incentives (Hayes, 1998; Morgan and Stocken, 2003; Fischer and 
Stocken, 2010). This research finds that analysts’ incentives influence their information 
gathering decisions and communication with investors. Trueman (1994) finds that high ability 
analysts overweight public information signals relative to private signals in order to maintain 
reputation. Jackson (2005) shows that analysts favor building up long-term reputation over 
the potential short-term gains from generating more trading commission for their banks.  
The analyst literature also draws a link between analyst target prices and their stock 
recommendations. The general understanding in the literature is that analysts make stock 
valuations to derive or justify their stock recommendations. For example, Bradshaw (2002) 
finds that there is a relationship between the direction of analyst stock recommendations and 
the degree of overpricing or underpricing implied by analyst target prices. He finds that 
analysts are more likely to make larger target price revisions when issuing more positive 
recommendations. Given this relationship between analyst target prices and recommendation 
revisions, in addition to the incremental information content of target prices over stock 
recommendations (e.g., Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005), it seems unlikely that 
institutional investors trade upon analyst stock recommendations alone and do not trade upon 
the information contained in target prices. It also seems unlikely that institutional investors 
fail to recognize the incremental information of star over non-star target price revisions when 
they make a clear distinction between star and non-star analysts when following 
recommendations. However, stock recommendations are relatively sticky variables whereas 
target prices are relatively more volatile. Changes in target prices happen a lot more often 
than changes in recommendations. Moreover, target prices provide information on the 
expected absolute return, whereas recommendations are an indication of the relative 
attractiveness of the stock. Therefore, it is possible that target price revisions are 
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uninformative or less informative than stock recommendations to institutional investors. No 
prior research examines whether institutional investors distinguish between target price 
revisions by star and non-star analysts. This study fills this gap and addresses the important 
economic question: Does analyst ranking influence the degree to which target prices influence 
the trading of institutional investors?  
Using consensus target prices does not provide unambiguous inferences about the relation 
between institutional ownership changes and analyst forecasting behavior because target price 
revisions by some analysts contain valuable information incremental to revisions by other 
analysts. Moreover, institutional investors are likely to trade on valuable revisions rather than 
on the consensus forecast. While institutional investors cannot observe the information 
analysts gather, they can compare analyst forecasts to the consensus and form a view on 
whether an analyst report adds value. Institutional investors are unlikely to blindly follow the 
consensus target price forecast. They know that, for a variety of reasons, analysts feel pressure 
to bias their forecasts upward. They are also better placed than retail investors to estimate the 
bias in analyst forecasts and make investment decisions based on valuable information. 
Further support for the conjecture that some analysts’ target price revisions explain 
institutional ownership changes better than the consensus target price forecast comes from the 
fact that analysts choose when to disseminate valuable information through their forecasts. 
This is evident from Frankel et al.’s (2006) finding that the information content of analyst 
forecasts increases with increases in return volatility and trading volume. Frankel et al. 
interpret these findings as follows (p. 31):  
This result suggests that analysts provide more information when profit opportunities 
for informed traders increase. Under these circumstances, I expect investors to seek 
more information from analysts. My result is thus consistent with analysts responding 
to increased investor demand for private information. 
This implies that analysts choose when to issue valuable revisions. It also implies that 
analysts provide information when there is a demand for it and when they are likely to realize 
benefits from meeting this demand, higher than the costs of information processing. Chen and 
Jiang’s (2005) evidence on optimistic weighting, also motivates this reasoning. According to 
this phenomenon, analysts place more weight on private than on public information when 
issuing good news relative to the consensus forecast and more weight on public than on 
private information when issuing bad news relative to the market consensus. They also find 
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that this phenomenon is less common among less experienced analysts, who have higher 
reputational concerns due to the high potential cost associated with optimistic weighting.  
I further argue that analyst ranking status determines the value of the information analysts 
disclose through target prices. Disclosure quality can be a voluntary choice of the analyst or a 
response to increased institutional investor demand for information. The demand for 
informative research increases for stocks with high institutional ownership (Frankel et al., 
2006). Ljungqvist et al. (2007) provide evidence that equity analysts are less likely to bias 
their forecasts upward for stocks that are highly visible to institutional investors. I extend this 
to argue that analysts with differing star status have different abilities and incentives to make 
informative target price revisions and attract market attention. Hence, I expect to see 
differences between the effect of target price revisions by star and non-star analysts on the 
change in institutional ownership. Moreover, if institutional investors follow the revisions of 
star analysts then this should signal that target price revisions are not attention-grabbing 
events. I therefore test the following hypothesis,  
H1: The change in institutional ownership is positively related to changes in target price 
revisions by star analysts. 
Further, I investigate whether analyst target prices are subject to market scrutiny. I explore 
whether star analysts face pressure to conform to the consensus when making target price 
revisions in order to protect their star status. If I find evidence that target price quality does 
not affect the likelihood of analysts gaining their star status then star analysts may have 
incentives to issue biased or uninformative revisions. To examine this reasoning, I test the 
following hypothesis,  
H2: Analyst target price quality affects the likelihood of acquiring analyst star status.  
3. Sample  
My sample consists of US public companies receiving equity analyst coverage between 2000 
and 2009. I obtain data on analyst target price forecasts, earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations from the I/B/E/S database. I exclude observations that do not include a 
target price forecast. I also exclude observations that do not disclose the identity of the analyst 
issuing the forecast because it is not possible to identify whether the analyst making this 
forecasts is a star analyst or not. I collect data on analyst rankings from Institutional Investor. 
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I match this data with the analyst report observations. If analysts are listed in the All-America 
Team, they are classified as star analysts in all research report observations following the 
Institutional Investor October issue until the next October issue.
4
 To construct the other 
variables in the analysis, I collect daily stock price data from CRSP, quarterly accounting 
indicator data and earnings announcements from the CRSP/Compustat merged database and 
data on quarterly institutional common stock holdings from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13F) Database.
5
 The final sample comprises 52,483 quarterly changes in 
institutional holding observations for 2,646 public US stocks. I use this data to model the 
relation between analyst target price revisions and changes in institutional ownership using 
Heckman’s two stage selection model combined with a duration analysis that models the 
analyst forecast revision events. I conduct a second duration analysis that models analyst star 
ranking events. For this analysis, I decompose my sample into analyst-level annual 
observations. The decomposed sample covers the same sample of US public companies that 
receive equity analyst coverage between 2000 and 2009. The sample consists of 549 research 
departments and 7,527 analysts. This analyst-level sample comprises a total of 352,198 
observations (including 90,702 analyst ex-star ranking event observations).  
4. Research design and model  
Not all institutional quarterly ownership change observations in my sample are accompanied 
by target price revisions by star analysts.
6
 This observation is consistent with observations in 
the literature that analysts withhold disclosing target prices in almost 30% of their reports 
(Asquith et al., 2005; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Bradshaw, 2002). I expect analysts’ decisions 
to make target price revisions to be endogenous, resulting in a selection bias. I employ 
Heckman’s two stage analysis to examine the relationship between the information content of 
target prices by star and non-star analysts and changes in institutional ownership. This 
research design makes it possible to correct for selection bias. This correction is necessary 
because the relationship between institutional ownership changes and analyst revisions is 
likely to depend on the analyst decision to make a revision. The literature documents this 
interrelation between analyst forecasting behavior and institutional interest (Schipper, 1991; 
                                                          
4
 The Institutional Investor All-America team ranking classification includes first, second, and third team 
analysts as well as runners up.  
5 This database was formerly the CDA/Spectrum 34 database. It contains institutional ownership information 
reported on Form 13F filed with the SEC. Institutional owners are managers with $100 million or more in Assets 
Under Management.  
6
 Only 21,551 of the 52,483 quarterly changes in institutional holdings observations are accompanied by target 
price revisions by star analysts.  
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Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997, 2003; Das, et al., 1998). Analysts issue more informative 
forecasts for firms that are highly visible to institutional investors (Frankel et al., 2006). 
Additionally, the presence of institutional investors influences analysts’ private information 
dissemination decisions by increasing analyst following (Bhushan, 1989). Similarly, the 
information disseminated by analysts in their reports may influence the behavior of 
institutional investors. Positive analyst forecast revisions are associated with increases in 
institutional holdings (Ackert and Athanassakos, 2003). Consequently, institutional ownership 
and analyst coverage are jointly determined (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Ackert and 
Athanassakos, 2003).  
I estimate the first stage of the model using a duration analysis rather than a probit model.
7
 I 
conduct the duration analysis to analyze analyst decisions to issue or withhold target price 
revision in a particular quarter. To define the duration variable for a target price observation i 
occurring in quarter t, I aggregate all analyst reports covering stock j for the two groups of 
star and non-star revisions. I then calculate the duration variable as the period starting with the 
most recent revision issued by the analyst group (star or non-star) to cover stock j at time t−1 
and ending at time t. The duration variable therefore captures the time it takes for an analyst 
group to revise their previous forecast. After defining the time variable, duration analysis 
specifies the probability distribution of the variable using a hazard function. The hazard 
function gives the probability that analysts who have made previous forecasts, revise their 
forecasts at a specific point in time. Estimating the hazard function determines the effect of 
the covariates on the average number of days between revisions and the probability of 
occurrence of the revision. Analyzing duration data using ordinary least-squares (OLS) and 
logistic regressions is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the alternative models cannot allow 
for the inclusion of time varying covariates. Second, duration data are often subject to 
censoring. If a group of analysts does not provide any target price revisions for a particular 
company in a quarter, the observation is censored. Duration models can handle censored data 
while the two alternative methods waste information by dropping censored observations.
8
 In 
my setting, retaining censored information is important to control for selection bias. 
Moreover, using a static model ignores the fact that analyst decisions to revise target prices 
represent the termination of a continuous spell of adopting a target price forecast, a spell that 
                                                          
7 Sensitivity tests show that the results are not different using a probit model. However, probit estimation 
assumes a static model and does not take account of differences in the time each analyst takes to revise an earlier 
forecast. Duration analysis is more flexible in the way that covariates affect event outcomes.  
8
 Although it is possible to adjust linear regression models to deal with censored data, duration models offer 
better ways of handling censoring of high durations (Berg, 2001, p. 3388). 
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is of varying length for each analyst group. Duration analysis overcomes this problem by 
explicitly controlling for time and allowing for time varying covariates. It accounts for the 
fact that analysts’ decisions and their tendency to revise their forecasts change through time. 
In other words, duration analysis offers a tool to assess empirical changes using continuously 
measured variables. The duration model uses all available information to determine the 
probability of an analyst group making a forecast revision at each point in time. Conducting 
such a comprehensive examination can help control for the endogeneity of the analyst target 
price revision decision. I use recurrent event data to improve the estimation, overcome any 
identification problems and efficiently handle the task of defining censored observations.  
Duration analysis requires specifying the underlying distribution of the hazard function. As 
there is no strong argument for a specific parametric model, I use a semi-parametric (or 
proportional) model, which only specifies a functional form for the influence of the covariates 
and leaves the shape of the hazard rate unspecified. I estimates Cox’s proportional hazard 
model, which takes the following form,  
   0| ( ), ( )exp 'h t N t X t X      (1) 
In equation (1),  0 t is the baseline hazard, which is the rate of occurrence of the event (e.g., 
a target price revision by star analysts) when all explanatory variables are equal to zero. The 
vector X contains all covariates determining forecast revision decisions and β is a vector of 
parameters. The term N(t) counts the number of revisions issued by each analyst group before 
the end of the sample period. The effect of the covariates is to induce proportional shifts in the 
hazard rate but not to change its shape. The advantage of analyzing duration data using Cox’s 
model is that it allows for semi-parametric estimation of 𝛽 without the need to specify the 
functional form of the baseline hazard. This is an advantage because misspecification of the 
baseline hazard results in inconsistent parameter estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Hence, the model is convenient when testing hypotheses only requires information on the 
magnitude and direction of the effects of observed covariates, controlling for time 
dependence.  
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Little is known about the determinants of analyst target price disclosure.
9
 When making 
disclosure decisions, analysts may consider the effect of forecast disclosure on their 
reputation, career prospects, the business that their revisions generate for their investment 
banks and brokers, their relationships with companies, their performance relative to other 
analysts, etc. I construct a duration model to examine the determinants of analyst decisions to 
revise target prices in a specific quarter. This analysis contributes to our knowledge of the 
drivers of analyst decisions. It also serves as a guide for future research developing advanced 
methods for assessing the quality of analyst reports. I estimate the following duration model, 
at the analyst level,
10
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The underlying assumption of the model in equation (2) is that the analyst forecast revision 
decision depends on the benefit the analyst expects to generate from making the revision as 
well as market related factors.
11
 The number of large institutional investors holding shares in 
the firm the analyst is covering (Top) is likely to influence analysts’ decisions to revise their 
forecasts. Institutional investors are the primary users of analysts’ reports. If analysts consider 
the presence of institutional investors when revising target prices, it is likely that the 
importance of the institutional investor influences the revision. Institutional investor votes for 
analysts are weighted by the size of funds under management. Therefore, larger institutional 
investors have more power to influence analyst rankings. It is, therefore, more plausible that 
analysts alter their forecasting behavior when covering stocks held by the largest institutions. 
Hence, I expect analysts to have greater incentives to revise forecasts for stocks primarily 
owned by large institutions. Information about the amount of money under management or 
the size of the institution is not readily available. Therefore, to investigate this conjecture, 
similar to Ljungqvist et al. (2007), I first identify the top 100 institutional investors in the 
market ranked by the total value of their equity holdings in the last quarter of the year prior to 
the beginning of my sample. I count how many of these investors hold stocks in each firm 
                                                          
9
 The most relevant literature is an attempt to study the determinants of analysts’ revision frequency, which is the 
number of revisions analysts make within a specific time period (e.g., Holden and Stuerke, 2008) and a study of 
the determinants of analyst following (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990).  
10
 I use multivariate duration data because more than one event may occur for the same analyst. The event times 
are therefore correlated within analyst clusters, violating the independence of event times assumption required in 
traditional duration analysis. 
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 The covariate ln Shares is the natural log of the total number of shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the current quarter. Positive cumulative stock returns (Mom), 
negative returns (Neg), and the interaction between them (Neg × Mom) capture the extent to 
which revisions are associated with new public information.
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 Beta (Beta) and the standard 
deviation of residuals (SD) control for systematic and unsystematic risks of the stock. I also 
control for the number of analysts following in the previous quarter (LnAnlys) and the level of 
institutional ownership in the previous quarter (Linst) because I expect revision decisions to 
depend on whether or not they are for companies that are highly visible to institutional 
investors. Last, industry dummies (I) capture industry-related differences in analyst behavior. 
I expect a positive association between analyst revision decisions, lagged institutional 
ownership, lagged analyst following, and number of shares outstanding. 
I treat changes in institutional ownership and analyst decisions to revise target prices as 
endogenous and estimate the second stage of Heckman’s model using the OLS regression 
equation (3) below to model institutional ownership change and analyst target price revisions. 
I estimate the following model of the relation between changes in institutional ownership and 
changes in analyst target price forecasts for the two analyst ranking groups.  
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       (3) 
To examine the trading behavior of institutional investors, I use a conventional measure of 
institutional ownership change (e.g., Jiang, 2010; Lin and Tan, 2011), the change in 
institutional investor holdings at the end of the quarter (Δinst). The main right-side variables 
in equation (3) are the two changes in analyst target price consensus for the two ranking 
groups, ΔTPstar and ΔTPnon, corresponding to changes in target price revisions by star and 
non-star analysts. For each analyst–firm, I use the most recent forecast issued within the 
quarter to eliminate the impact of stale forecasts and compute the analyst target price 
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 The results hold when I use the aggregate size (instead of the aggregate count) of the top 100 investors in each 
firm in each quarter, similar to Ljungqvist et al. (2007).  
13
 I split stock returns into positive and negative returns to capture the different reactions of analysts to good 
news and bad news, where stock returns proxy for the type of news. Basu (1997) uses this technique.  
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consensus for each ranking status group as the mean of the latest target prices issued by 
analysts in a specific ranking group for each firm.
14
 I calculate the change in target price as 
the difference in the average target prices in quarters t and t−1 scaled by the average target 
price in quarter t−1. The choice of control variables in equation (3) is motivated by earlier 
literature on the determinants of institutional ownership changes. All control variables are 
measured at the same quarter-end as the target price revisions.
15
 They include: (i) change in 
EPS consensus (ΔEPS); (ii) change in recommendation consensus (ΔREC); (iii) past stock 
returns (Mom); (iv) change in the stock beta (ΔBeta); (v) change in firm specific risk (ΔSD); 
(vi) change in return volatility (ΔVol); (vii) change in dividend yield (ΔDiv); (viii) price to 
earnings ratio (PE); (ix) book-to-market ratio (BM); (x) market capitalization (ln Cap); (xi) 
lagged institutional holding (Linst); (xii) return on equity (ROE); (xiii) change in the number 
of analysts following the firm in a quarter (ΔnStar); (xiv) leverage (Lev), (xv) turnover 
(Turn), and (xvi) quarter (Q) and year (Y) dummies. Change in beta (ΔBeta), change in 
standard deviation (ΔSD), and change in volatility (ΔVol) control for risk. Institutional 
ownership changes should be negatively correlated with risk because institutional investors 
prefer low volatility stocks. Company size (ln Cap) and change in deviation from consensus 
(ΔDiv) control for investment constraints. Change in number of stars following (ΔnStar) and 
turnover (Turn) capture institutional investor preferences for visible companies and stock 
liquidity. Institutional ownership changes should be positively correlated with market 
capitalization, number of analysts following, and turnover but negatively correlated with 
dividends. Leverage (Lev) controls for capital structure. PE and BM capture institutional 
investor preferences for value–glamour trading. ROE controls for financial performance and 
Mom captures stock performance. Lagged institutional ownership (Linst) controls for initial 
investment positions. Quarter dummies control for seasonality in institutional ownership 
changes, as institutional investors tend to rebalance their portfolios and reallocate funds at the 
beginning of the year. Finally, invMills is the computed inverse Mills ratio for each 
observation in the sample from the duration model in equation (2). The measurement of 
control variables follows prior research.  
To conduct the second analysis on the effect of target price quality on the likelihood of the 
occurrence of analyst star ranking events, I estimate a second duration model, 
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 Using the median instead of the mean does not affect the robustness of the results.  
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 Similar to previous research (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990), I use changes in the endogenous variables 
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where the dependent variable is the hazard rate of an XSTAR event occurring (that is, the 
likelihood of a star analyst losing star status at time t). As in equation (1), the term N(t) counts 
the number of times an event occurs before the end of the sample period. The term 
0
( )h t  is 
the baseline hazard, which is the rate of occurrence of the event of an analyst losing star status 
when all explanatory variables are equal to zero. The exponential term captures factors 
affecting the occurrence of the event. The covariates include variables capturing factors that 
are likely to determine the probability of an analyst losing a star ranking. The independent 
variables are similar to those in Leone and Wu (2007) and are measured in the year prior to 
the release of the Institutional Investor analyst ranking.
16
 The covariates include the absolute 
target price forecast error (TPerr) and the absolute EPS forecast error (EPSerr). TPbold 
measures the boldness of the analyst target price forecast. RECret is the adjusted return based 
on the analyst recommendation. LFR is the analyst leader–follower ratio. The model controls 
for analyst experience (Exp), the number of firms the analyst is covering (Nfirm) and revision 
frequency (Freq). StarBank is a top bank indicator and inst is the level of institutional 
ownership in a firm. If analyst target price forecast error (TPerr) or boldness (TPbold) 
influences institutional decisions to vote analysts stars, there should be significant hazard 
ratios on those two covariates.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in the study. Mean changes in beta, 
return volatility, firm-specific risk, and dividend yield are close to zero. Mean momentum is 
0.02. The average change in EPS forecast revision is −0.01. The average of the two target 
price revisions by ranking status are 0.05 for both ΔTPstar and ΔTPnon. PE averages 2.34, BM 
0.53, and Lev 0.23. The summary statistics for the other variables used in the second analysis 
show no particular concern for the duration analysis. Table 3 reports Pearson correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables in the two models. Although there are some 
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 The main difference is that Leone and Wu do not consider the target price forecast error (TPerr). I also control 
for the level of institutional ownership (inst). Leone and Wu (2007) use a probit analysis rather than a duration 
analysis to estimate the model. Estimation from a duration analysis is more robust because duration analysis 
focuses on the conditional probability of star ranking events persisting over time as a function of a set of 
explanatory variables, whereas a probit model links the unconditional probability of star ranking at any point in 
time to a set of explanatory factors, independently of past ranking events. 
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significant correlations between the independent variables, including the variables in the 
regressions does not create a multicollinearity problem.
17
  
5. Empirical results   
 
5.1. Univariate analysis  
The underlying assumption behind my argument in the preceding discussion is that star 
analysts distinguish themselves with higher quality target prices. No prior evidence 
empirically documents whether reputable sell-side analysts produce higher-quality target 
price forecasts relative to non-reputable analysts. Thus, I use univariate analysis to validate 
this assumption. I test for differences in mean and median target price accuracy, EPS accuracy 
and target price boldness between the two groups of analysts and report the results in table 4. 
Consistent with expectations, star analysts make significantly smaller target price forecast 
errors and significantly smaller EPS forecast errors compared with non-star analysts. The 
results are significant according to both mean and median differences tests. However, I find 
that the degree of deviation from target price consensus is significantly smaller for star 
analysts than non-star analysts. This may suggest that star analysts face pressure to conform 
to the consensus when making target price revisions. I now examine whether institutional 
investors distinguish between the revisions of star and non-star analysts.  
5.2. Star analysts and target price revisions  
Before I estimate equation (2), I test the key assumption of the model, the proportionality of 
the hazard rates. Based on the Schoenfeld Residuals test and the time dependent covariates 
test, none of the covariates in the model violates the proportional hazard assumption.
18
 Table 
5 reports the coefficients and hazard ratios for the probability that star analysts make target 
price revisions for a firm in a quarter. The estimation spans the sample period 2000–2009. I 
estimate the Cox proportional hazard model where the event of interest is the disclosure of 
target price revisions by star analysts. The results show that star analysts are more likely to 
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 Adding the 47 industry and 10 year dummy variables and dummies for quarters 2 to 4 results in high 
multicollinearity between these variables. Therefore, the regression excludes the industry dummies. This does 
not change inferences. 
18
 The time dependent covariates test includes interactions of the predictors and a function of the duration time in 
the model and tests for their significance. A significant interaction between any of the predictors and the duration 
time function indicates that the predictors are not proportional. The Schoenfeld Residuals test detects non-
proportionality by testing for a non-zero slope from the regression of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on functions of 
time. 
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revise target prices for companies with larger numbers of shares outstanding, larger number of 
analysts following, larger institutional ownership level and larger number of institutional 
investors. Star analysts are also more likely to revise for companies with higher firm-specific 
risk. On the other hand, the coefficients of Mom, PE, and Beta are negative and significant 
indicating that star analysts are less likely to revise their target prices for companies with 
higher momentum, price to earnings ratio, and beta. I use the probabilities estimated from this 
model to compute the inverse Mills ratio for all observations in the sample and use this ratio 
in the second stage estimation to control for selection bias.  
5.3. Target price revisions and changes in institutional ownership  
I estimate the second stage of Heckman’s regression using equation (3). The results in Table 6 
show that there is a selection bias, indicated by the significant coefficients on invMills. 
Column 1 presents the estimation of the model using the entire sample and where the main 
independent variable of interest is ΔTP. This variable aggregates all target price revisions by 
star and non-star analysts. This estimation shows that target price revisions positively and 
significantly influence the change in institutional ownership with a coefficient of 0.439. This 
coefficient is significantly higher than the coefficients on the EPS revisions and 
recommendation changes, supporting previous findings in the literature that target prices 
contain information incremental to the information disseminated through other analyst 
forecasts. Table 6, column 2 decomposes the change in target price by analyst ranking. The 
coefficient on the first independent variable, ΔTPstar, captures the association between 
changes in institutional ownership and target price revisions by star analysts only. The 
coefficient on the second variable, ΔTPnon, captures institutional ownership changes 
association with target price revisions by non-star analysts. The results show institutional 
ownership change  is positively related to the revisions of star analysts. In contrast, 
institutional ownership change is negatively related to the revisions of non-stars, with the 
results significant at 10%. This indicates that only star analyst target price revisions are 
informative to institutional investors. The observation that institutional investors change their 
ownership levels in the opposite direction of the target price revisions of non-star analysts 
may suggest that institutional investors do not trust the revisions of non-star analysts and 
consequently trade in the opposite direction of those revisions. The coefficients on the control 
variables that capture institutional preferences are generally consistent with the literature. 
Most coefficients are significant except for the coefficients on the change in dividend, 
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leverage and the change in the number of analysts following. Change in institutional 
ownership is positively associated with price momentum, consistent with institutional 
investors having a higher preference for stocks with positive momentum. Change in 
institutional ownership is also positively associated with change in stock beta, change in 
standard deviation, PE ratio, and ROE. Also, the coefficient on turnover is positive, consistent 
with institutional investors preferring to trade liquid stocks. Institutional ownership change is 
negatively associated with initial institutional holdings. That is, the larger the institutional 
investors’ holdings in a firm are at the beginning of a quarter, the less likely they will increase 
this holding during that quarter. I also find the coefficient on company size is significantly 
negative, suggesting that institutional investors trade small firms more actively.  
To further understand the reaction of institutional investors to target price revisions by star 
and non-star analysts, I split the sample by the sign of the change in target price revision and 
report the results in table 7.   I examine whether institutional investor behavior changes when 
analysts provide positive compared to negative target price revisions.  I re-estimate equation 
(3) for two separate sub-samples of positive and negative changes in target price forecasts. 
Column 1 of table 7 presents the results for the sub-sample whether both groups of analysts 
provide upward target price revisions. This reduces the size of the sample to 9,019 
observations. The results show that the change in institutional ownership is negatively related 
to the upward revisions of non-star analysts with the result being significant at 5%. 
Institutional ownership is not significantly related to the upward target price revisions by star 
analysts. The results imply that institutional investors do not fully trust the upward target 
price revisions of analysts generally. Column 2 presents the results for the sub-sample where 
both groups of analysts provide downward target price revisions. The results based on 7,921 
observations suggest that institutional ownership changes are positively related to downward 
target price revisions by star analysts while the relationship is not significant for the 
downward revisions by non-star analysts.  This last finding may be related to institutional 
investors finding negative target price revisions by star analysts more informative than their 
positive target price revisions. This supports findings by Clarke et al. (2012) on the 
association between institutional ownership changes and analyst recommendation upgrades 
and downgrades. The results are also consistent when I repeat the above analysis 
(untabulated) using the two other sub-samples when star analysts provide upward revisions 
while non-star analysts provide downward revisions or star analysts provide downward 
revisions and non-star analysts provide upward revisions.  
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5.4. Target price quality and analyst star ranking   
The analysis of the effects of analyst ranking give useful insights into analyst and institutional 
behavior. The collective results suggest that analyst star ranking is a determinant of 
institutional investor reaction to analyst revisions. Now I examine whether analyst target price 
quality is also subject to market scrutiny. I conduct this analysis using a dynamic duration 
model. It is particularly important to use duration analysis for this estimation because duration 
analysis can examine the relationship between analyst transition from a star to a non-star state 
and the time spent in each state. It also examines the relationship between analyst transitions 
and other covariates determining the transition, such as analyst target price quality. 
Conducting this analysis using a static model, it would be impossible to address questions 
such as: Does the likelihood of going ex-star decrease with the length of time an analyst 
remains a star? And does the presence of low target price quality increase the risk of an 
analyst going ex-star?  
Table 8 reports estimates of the duration model of equation (4). The table reports both 
coefficients and hazard ratios. The Cox regression model reports estimation for the likelihood 
of a star analyst losing star status (XSTAR event). The hazard rates give the relative rates of an 
event occurring. For example, in column 1, the table shows that the hazard rate on the star 
investment bank dummy is 0.681. This suggests that analysts who work for star rated banks 
face an ex-star rating hazard of 0.681 relative to the hazard of analysts who work for less 
popular brokers.  That is, analysts of star banks have a lower incidence of ex-star rating than 
analysts of non-star banks. The hazard rate on TPerr is 1.369, significant at 1%, indicating 
that all else being equal, for every unit increase in target price error, the hazard of an analyst 
becoming ex-star changes by a factor of 1.369. In other words, there is a 36.9% increase in 
ex-star rating events for every one unit increase in target price error. The hazard rate on 
TPbold is 0.849, significant at 1%, suggesting that for every unit increase in target price 
deviation from the consensus, the hazard of an analyst becoming ex-star changes by a factor 
of 0.849. Consistently, the coefficient on TPerr is significantly positive while the coefficient 
on TPbold is significantly negative. This means that an increase in analyst target price error 
increases the rate of ex-star events occurring while an increase in analyst deviation from 
consensus decreases the hazard of ex-rating events. The main finding from this analysis is that 
the quality of target price revisions is crucial for analysts to maintain star status. This implies 
that the market penalizes high target price forecast errors when updating analyst reputations. 
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5.5. Sensitivity tests    
The previous analysis shows that star analysts make target price revisions that are more 
credible than those of non-star analysts. Further, the study shows that the quality of analyst 
target prices affects analyst reputation. I test the robustness of the findings using a series of 
sensitivity tests. First, an alternative explanation for the main finding is that star analysts 
cover stocks that are easier to forecast or that are not covered by other analysts and that this 
may bias the results. To check the robustness of the results against this possibility, I conduct a 
univariate analysis and I find that star analysts cover stocks that are covered widely by non-
star analysts. Additionally, I use an alternative research design by controlling for selection 
bias using matching procedures combined with a duration analysis. I match observations that 
have star analyst coverage with observations that have non-star analyst coverage while 
controlling for firm characteristics. The results for star analyst target prices (not tabulated) 
remain similar to the main analysis. Since this approach reduces the sample size, I do not use 
it in my main analysis. 
Second, in the main analysis, I adopt the view that analyst target prices are public 
information, and it would be naïve for institutional investors to trade on past analyst target 
prices. Nonetheless, I test the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of one-quarter lagged 
star and non-star analyst target price revisions. I find that the results are consistent with the 
main analysis and there are no significant coefficients on the lagged variables. The results of 
this robustness check also rules out the possibility that analysts make their target price 
revisions after observing the behavior of institutional investors. Moreover, I find that the 
results are consistent when I divide the sample into institutional holdings by active and 
passive institutional investors following Bushee (1998); active institutional investors find star 
revisions significantly more informative.  
Additionally, I test the sensitivity of the main findings to controlling for additional variables 
that determine the analyst decision to make target price revision. I add four independent 
dummy variables to the duration model of equation (2) to control for seasoned equity 
offerings, convertible stocks, debt issues and merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions that 
take place within the duration of each observation in my sample. I also include a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the target price disclosure observation follows an earnings 
announcement by the company. I collect earnings announcements data from the 
CRSP/Compustat merged database. The equity and debt offerings, and M&A data are from 
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Thomson One Banker. I find that the results on the duration model as well as the results on 
the second stage analysis are not sensitive to this inclusion. I also test the sensitivity of the 
results to adding seven accounting indicators to equation (2): market to book ratio, earnings 
per share to price ratio, revenue to assets ratio, return on equity, dividend yield, leverage ratio, 
and a dummy variable to indicate whether the stock daily price exceeds the 200-day moving 
average. Those variables serve as additional control variables since companies with good 
financial and operating performance are more likely to receive greater analyst coverage. I find 
that the results are consistent with the main findings. Last, one of the main challenges in 
analyzing duration data is the presence of informative censoring. In my sample, informative 
censoring may occur if right-censored observations are likely to have higher or lower hazard 
rates than the rest of the sample, due to unobserved factors. Although this is very unlikely, I 
test the sensitivity of the results to dropping all right-censored observations. I also conduct a 
second test that expands the sample size by one year to cover a sufficient period to observe 
events for previously right-censored observations. Both results confirm that the main findings 
are not subject to informative censoring bias.    
6. Conclusion  
I present empirical evidence that analysts with star ranking draw significantly higher 
institutional interest. This result should give analysts a strong economic incentive to make 
informative target price revisions. I examine the information content of consensus target 
prices to institutional investors. The overall consensus forecast represents an aggregation of 
the opinions of all analysts following the firm. There are many reasons, however, why 
institutional investors could be sensitive to the information content of specific analyst target 
price revisions and not to the overall consensus. I therefore disaggregate the consensus by 
analyst ranking status in determining institutional investor preferences. Using a sample of 
I/B/E/S target price data between 2000 and 2009, I investigate the association between 
changes in institutional investment and analyst target price revisions by star analysts. I define 
a target price revision as informative if it is positively associated with changes in institutional 
ownership. The literature on changes in institutional ownership in response to changes in the 
analyst forecast consensus does not make it possible to understand which analysts issue 
informative target price revisions and why they do so. Such an understanding is critical to 
assessing the role of analysts in information production and in influencing institutional 
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investors’ decisions. My study presents the first attempt to analyze whether analyst target 
prices are aimed at exploiting unsophisticated investors.  
My evidence shows that aggregating all target prices into a consensus forecast leads to an 
incomplete assessment of the value of the information content of analyst target prices. I show 
that star analysts have different influences on institutional investor decisions. The results 
indicate that only star analysts’ target prices are informative to institutional investors and 
there is a sizeable portion of analysts whose target price revisions have no noticeable impact 
on institutional trading behavior. I also show that non-star analysts are less likely to attract 
institutional investor attention through their target price revisions. My analysis shows that 
equity analysts can add value by offering more information, through their target prices, than is 
already available to the public. They can shape market perceptions and expectations and are in 
effect key protagonists in influencing market reaction.  
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Beta Beta  The coefficient in a regression of monthly returns of firm i on 
CRSP value-weighted index returns over the 36 months prior to 
the end of quarter t. 
ΔBeta Change in beta The change in the value of Beta for the stock between quarter t 
and quarter t −1.  
BM Book to market 
ratio 
The total book value of the firm at the end of the previous fiscal 
quarter divided by total market equity on the last trading day of 
the previous quarter.  
ΔDiv Change in dividend 
yield 
The change in dividend per share for quarter t from Compustat 
divided by the share price at the end of the quarter. 
ΔEPS Change in EPS 
consensus  
The latest consensus EPS forecast in quarter t, minus the latest 
consensus EPS forecast in quarter t−1, divided by the stock 
price at the end of quarter t−1, winsorized at the upper and 
lower 1% levels (using the summary file). 
Δinst Change in 
institutional 
ownership  
The difference in percentage ownership of institutional 
investors between quarter t and quarter t−1. Percentage 
ownership is shares held by institutional investors divided by 
total shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter, 
winsorized at the upper and lower 10% levels.  
Lev Leverage Total debt divided by the market value of assets at the end of 
quarter t.  
Linst Lagged institutional 
ownership 
Institutional ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding at 
the end of quarter t−1 from 13F. 
ln Cap Market 
capitalization  
Natural log of stock price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of quarter t. 
LnStar Lagged number of 
star analysts 
following 
Natural log of the total number of star analysts following the 
stock of firm i in quarter t −1.  
ln Shrs Number of shares 
outstanding  
Natural log of the total number of shares outstanding for firm i 
at the beginning of quarter t.  
Mom Momentum  Stock abnormal return for the three months prior to quarter t.  
ΔnAnlys Change in number 
of analysts 
following  
The change in the natural log of the total number of analysts 
covering the stock of firm i between quarter t and quarter t−1.  
Neg Negative returns  Takes the value 1 if Mom is negative, and zero otherwise.  
PE Price earnings ratio Stock price divided by the sum of income before extraordinary 
items in the firm’s most recent fiscal quarters from Compustat, 
winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels.  
ΔREC Change in 
recommendation 
consensus  
The difference between the consensus recommendations of 
quarter t and quarter t−1, scaled by the consensus 
recommendation during quarter t−1. Recommendations from 
I/B/E/S are recoded so that 5 represents a strong buy, 4 










ROE Return on equity Quarterly net income divided by common equity of the 
previous quarter from Compustat, winsorized at the upper and 
lower 1% levels.  
SD Standard deviation The standard deviation of the residuals in a regression of 
monthly returns of firm i on CRSP value-weighted index 
returns over the 36 months prior to the end of quarter t.  
ΔSD Change in standard 
deviation  
The change in the value of SD between quarter t and quarter 
t−1.  
Top Number of large 
institutional 
investors  
Natural log of one plus the aggregate number of large 
institutional investors holding shares in firm i in quarter t. 
Large institutional investors are defined as the top 100 
institutional investors in terms of their total holdings in all 
firms in the market.  
ΔTP Change in TP 
consensus  
The difference between the consensus target prices of quarter t 
and quarter t−1, divided by the consensus target price of 
quarter t−1.  
ΔTPnon Change in non-star 
TP consensus 
The difference between the consensus non-star target prices of 
quarter t and quarter t−1, divided by the consensus non-stars 
target price of quarter t−1. 
ΔTPstar Change in star TP 
consensus  
The difference between the consensus star target prices of 
quarter t and quarter t−1, divided by the consensus stars target 
price of quarter t−1. 
Turn Turnover Natural log of the average trading volume in the quarter, 
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the 
quarter. 
ΔVol Change in volatility The change in the standard deviation of firm i’s daily return in 
quarter t.  
EPSerr EPS forecast error The absolute value of the difference between the analyst EPS 
forecast and the actual EPS at the end of the forecast period 
scaled by the current share price.  
Exp Analyst experience Total number of years since the analyst started reporting 
forecasts to I/B/E/S. 




The total level of institutional ownership in a firm in the most 
recent quarter. 
LFR Leader follower 
ratio 
The leader–follower ratio from Cooper et al. (2001), equal to 
the ratio of the number of days the analyst is a follower to the 
number of days the analyst forecast is a leader.  
Nfirm Firms following  The number of firms the analyst is following in a year.  
RECret Recommendation 
return  
The difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the 
recommended stock and the value weighted CRSP index from 
the day before the analyst recommendation date to 30 days 
after the recommendation date, taking a long position for 
Strong Buy and Buy recommendations and a short position for 





Table 1 (Continued) 
Variable 
Symbol 
Name Definition  
StarBank Star bank dummy Takes the value 1 if the brokerage firm for which the analyst 
works is Institutional Investor top bank, and zero otherwise.  
TPbold Target price 
forecast boldness  
The absolute value of the difference between the analyst TP 
forecast and the current TP consensus forecast scaled by the 
current share price. 
TPerr Target price 
forecast error 
The absolute value of the difference between the analyst TP 
forecast and the actual price of the share in the market at the end 
of the forecast period scaled by the current share price. 
STAR Star dummy Takes the value 1 if a non-star analyst is rated a star for the first 
time in year t, and zero otherwise.  
XSTAR Ex-star dummy Takes the value 1 if either a star analyst is ex-rated in year t, and 











Beta 52483 1.22 0.95 −2.44 0.57 1.05 1.67 9.89 
ΔBeta 52483 0.01 0.32 −5.64 −0.12 0.01 0.13 4.31 
BM 52483 0.53 0.65 −76.85 0.27 0.44 0.66 17.42 
ΔDiv 52483 0.00 0.02 −1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 
ΔEPS 52483 −0.01 0.64 −3.51 −0.07 0.01 0.09 3.18 
Δinst 52483 0.54 3.63 −5.54 −1.71 0.25 2.77 7.10 
Lev 52483 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.36 6.70 
Linst 52483 0.65 0.25 0.00 0.49 0.69 0.84 1.00 
ln Cap 52483 7.30 1.67 0.58 6.11 7.18 8.36 13.31 
LnStar 52483 0.74 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 8.00 
ln Shrs 52483 11.04 1.28 6.31 10.16 10.88 11.78 18.30 
Mom 52483 0.02 0.24 −0.91 −0.10 0.01 0.12 10.84 
ΔnAnlys 52483 0.27 0.93 −0.92 −0.27 0.00 0.50 19.00 
Neg 52483 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Neg ×Mom 52483 -0.07 0.11 -0.91 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PE 52483 2.34 7.61 −24.93 0.13 0.93 3.18 46.69 
ΔREC 52483 −0.03 0.20 −1.00 −0.06 0.00 0.00 4.00 
ROE 52483 0.02 0.11 −0.66 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.43 
SD 52483 0.47 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.40 0.59 6.29 
ΔSD 52483 −0.01 0.08 −3.88 −0.02 0.00 0.02 1.97 
Top 52483 2.21 1.77 0.00 0.00 3.18 3.76 4.51 
ΔTP 52483 0.05 0.39 −0.69 −0.15 0.00 0.16 2.00 
ΔTPnon 52325 0.05 0.39 −0.69 −0.16 0.00 0.17 2.01 
ΔTPstar 21551 0.05 0.37 −0.73 −0.15 0.01 0.17 1.82 
Turn 52483 1.99 0.86 −2.65 1.46 2.03 2.56 5.82 
ΔVol 52483 0.00 0.01 −0.66 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.66 
EPSerr 340197 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 12.78 
Exp 340197 4.73 2.87 0.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 
Freq 340197 1.23 0.62 0.00 0.69 1.39 1.61 3.09 
STAR 340197 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
inst 340197 0.64 0.26 0.00 0.49 0.70 0.84 1.00 
LFR 340197 0.93 0.99 0.00 0.21 0.64 1.30 7.31 
Nfirms 340197 2.51 0.66 0.00 2.20 2.64 2.89 4.63 
RECret 340197 0.01 4.13 −1278 −0.07 0.01 0.09 1200 
StarBank 340197 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TPbold 340197 0.33 0.57 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.36 16.44 
TPerr 340197 0.42 0.52 0.00 0.14 0.31 0.52 15.29 
XSTAR 340197 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of institutional ownership observations for US 






Pearson correlations  
 
Beta ΔBeta BM ΔDiv ΔEPS Δinst Lev Linst ln Cap 
ΔBeta 0.150* 
        
BM 0.013* 0.053* 
       
ΔDiv −0.002 −0.007 −0.035* 
      
ΔEPS −0.026* −0.012* −0.037* −0.004 
     
Δinst 0.014* 0.017* −0.044* −0.008 0.032* 
    
Lev −0.077* 0.028* −0.010* 0.003 −0.005 0.000 
   
Linst 0.067* −0.017* −0.045* 0.006 0.007 −0.148* 0.034* 
  
ln Cap −0.158* −0.013* −0.220* 0.011* 0.052* −0.007 0.081* 0.170* 
 
LnStar −0.066* 0.013* −0.065* 0.003 0.016* −0.020* 0.083* 0.185* 0.507* 
ln Shrs 0.006 −0.006 −0.100* 0.001 0.011* −0.025* 0.089* 0.118* 0.823* 
Mom 0.035* 0.037* 0.101* −0.028* 0.057* 0.148* 0.018* −0.048* −0.075* 
ΔnAnlys −0.005 0.011* −0.028* 0.008 0.006 0.014* 0.011* 0.009 0.021* 
Neg 0.038* 0.014* −0.031* 0.015* −0.064* −0.114* −0.019* 0.013* 0.002 
Neg ×Mom −0.144* −0.033* −0.013* −0.025* 0.085* 0.175* 0.017* −0.006 0.114* 
PE −0.033* 0.001 0.040* −0.002 0.008 0.002 −0.066* −0.038* −0.182* 
ΔREC 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.010* 0.011* −0.002 −0.0184* −0.019* 
ROE −0.133* −0.013* −0.154* 0.002 0.046* 0.039* 0.017* 0.027* 0.194* 
SD 0.563* −0.020* −0.051* −0.002 −0.011* 0.045* −0.089* −0.024* −0.353* 
ΔSD 0.021* 0.184* 0.013* −0.019* 0.009* 0.095* 0.027* −0.038* 0.024* 
Top 0.000 0.035* −0.036* 0.000 0.001 −0.011* −0.033* 0.058* 0.129* 
ΔTP 0.016* −0.041* −0.124* 0.004 0.075* 0.101* −0.005 −0.012* 0.052* 
ΔTPnon 0.017* −0.040* −0.123* 0.005 0.074* 0.098* −0.005 −0.010* 0.053* 
ΔTPstar −0.006 −0.067* −0.139* −0.006 0.070* 0.063* −0.009 0.006 0.049* 
Turn 0.385* 0.008 −0.046* 0.010* −0.008 0.010* 0.010* 0.455* 0.150* 





Table 3 (Continued) 
 
LnStar ln Shrs Mom ΔnAnlys Neg 
Neg 
×Mom PE ΔREC ROE SD ΔSD Top ΔTP ΔTPnon ΔTPstar Turn 
ln Shrs 0.481* 
               Mom −0.014* −0.016* 
              ΔnAnlys −0.156* 0.013* 0.014* 
             Neg −0.009* −0.001 −0.642* −0.025* 
            Neg ×Mom 0.060* 0.053* 0.676* −0.024* −0.627* 
           
PE −0.102* −0.228* −0.009* −0.012* 0.009* −0.008 
          ΔREC −0.006 −0.020* 0.028* −0.051* −0.027* 0.021* 0.008 
         ROE 0.070* 0.052* 0.068* 0.010* −0.064* 0.177* 0.015* −0.002 
        SD −0.198* −0.195* 0.020* −0.001 0.040* −0.188* −0.005 0.010* −0.160* 
       ΔSD 0.007 0.008 0.095* −0.004 −0.034* 0.034* 0.009* −0.004 0.049* 0.080* 
      Top 0.096* 0.144* 0.020* 0.025* −0.017* 0.021* −0.031* −0.013* 0.011* −0.106* 0.044* 
     ΔTP −0.017* −0.019* 0.121* 0.085* −0.106* 0.144* 0.003 0.135* 0.079* 0.083* 0.071* −0.057* 
    ΔTPnon −0.015* −0.017* 0.121* 0.080* −0.107* 0.144* 0.004 0.130* 0.079* 0.083* 0.079* −0.057* 0.970* 
   ΔTPstar −0.027* −0.034* 0.136* 0.038* −0.123* 0.176* 0.009 0.083* 0.092* 0.074* 0.083* −0.069* 0.770* 0.683* 
  Turn 0.133* 0.148* 0.010* 0.040* 0.033* −0.175* −0.075* −0.012* −0.042* 0.312* −0.013* 0.047* 0.037* 0.035* −0.019* 
 ΔVol 0.006 −0.014* −0.113* 0.068* 0.077* −0.207* 0.003 0.002 −0.062* −0.009 −0.235* −0.048* −0.047* −0.048 −0.080* 0.063* 
Notes: The table reports Pearson correlations between the variables. Table 1 gives variables definitions. 







Univariate analysis: Star and non-star analysts 
 
Star analysts Non-star analysts Mean difference Median difference 
 
Mean Median Mean Median t-stat p-value z-stat p-value 
TPerr  0.387 0.286 0.424 0.311 14.77 0.000 19.57 0.000 
EPSerr 0.027 0.003 0.033 0.005 6.78 0.000 30.94 0.000 
TPbold  0.294 0.152 0.337 0.181 16.21 0.000 28.84 0.000 
Notes: The table reports the mean and median values of analyst target price error, EPS error and target 
price boldness for star and non-star analyst groups. The table also reports mean and median differences 





Star analysts target price revisions: Cox’s proportional hazard model   
 
Coefficient  Hazard rates 
ln Shrs 0.206*** 1.229*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Mom −0.340*** 0.711*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Neg −0.115*** 0.892*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Neg ×Mom 0.798*** 2.221*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
PE −0.010*** 0.990*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Beta −0.212*** 0.809*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
SD 0.324*** 1.383*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Top 0.096*** 1.100*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Linst 0.151** 1.163** 
 
[0.021] [0.021] 
LnStar 0.304*** 1.356*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Industry dummy Yes 
Wald χ2 2901.93 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
N 52,483 
Notes: The table reports estimates of a duration model of the determinants of star analyst 
decisions to revise target prices in a particular quarter. The table reports the coefficients and 
the hazard ratios. The estimation is based on 52,483 observations of which 21,551 
observations are uncensored. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-group correlation among 
stocks. Variables definitions are in table 1. 




Institutional ownership changes and target price revisions: Correcting for selection bias  















ΔEPS 0.072*** 0.095** 
 
[0.008] [0.048] 
ΔREC 0.023 0.507** 
 
[0.765] [0.037] 
Mom 1.924*** 2.170*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Linst −2.855*** −3.595*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
BM −0.203** −0.316*** 
 
[0.038] [0.000] 
ΔBeta 0.112** 0.236** 
 
[0.042] [0.015] 
ΔDiv −0.244 −0.534 
 
[0.816] [0.762] 
ΔSD 0.874*** 1.080** 
 
[0.000] [0.031] 
ΔVol −11.973*** −10.564*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Lev −0.013 −0.024 
 
[0.872] [0.835] 
ln Cap −0.077*** −0.132*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
PE 0.010*** −0.001 
 
[0.000] [0.772] 
ROE 0.460** −0.126 
 
[0.013] [0.632] 
Turn 0.476*** 0.501*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
ΔnAnlys 0.017 0.032 
 
[0.324] [0.187] 
invMills −3.904*** −5.501*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 2.424*** 3.413*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Quarter dummy Yes Yes 
R-squared 9.60% 9.60% 
N 52,483  21,551  
Notes: The table provides estimates of the relation between institutional ownership changes and analyst target price 
revisions. The dependent variable in all regressions is the change in institutional ownership, Δinst. The first column 
aggregates all analyst target price revisions and uses the variable ΔTP while the second column aggregates the 
change in target prices by analyst group: Star analysts’ revisions, ΔTPstar, and non-star analysts’ revisions, ΔTPnon. 
The regressions correct for selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratio computed using the estimated 
probabilities for each observation from the duration model in table 5. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the firm level to correct for cross-sectional dependence. Table 1 gives variables definitions. 




Institutional ownership changes and positive and negative target price revisions   
Δinst 
(1) 
Positive target price revisions  
(2) 
Negative target price revisions  
ΔTPstar −0.031 0.653* 
 
[0.818] [0.050] 
ΔTPnon −0.362** 0.365 
 
[0.011] [0.302] 
ΔEPS 0.023 −0.001 
 
[0.777] [0.990] 
ΔREC 0.414 0.524 
 
[0.300] [0.160] 
Mom 1.586*** 2.411*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Linst −4.473*** −2.906*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
BM 0.017 −0.208** 
 
[0.914] [0.019] 
ΔBeta 0.489*** 0.327** 
 
[0.002] [0.020] 
ΔDiv −5.048*** −0.347 
 
[0.009] [0.813] 
ΔSD 1.624* 0.944 
 
[0.062] [0.200] 
ΔVol −8.476* −6.879** 
 
[0.099] [0.031] 
Lev 0.112 −0.084 
 
[0.529] [0.658] 
ln Cap −0.236*** −0.045 
 
[0.000] [0.190] 
PE 0.005 −0.012 
 
[0.457] [0.138] 
ROE −0.667 0.18 
 
[0.148] [0.629] 
Turn 0.602*** 0.476*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
ΔnAnlys 0.003 0.01 
 
[0.794] [0.402] 
invMills −5.602*** −6.503*** 
 
[0.005] [0.002] 




  Quarter dummy 
  R-squared 10.7% 12.3% 
N       9,019        7,921  
Notes: The table reports estimates of the relationship between positive and negative target price revisions and institutional 
ownership changes. The dependent variable is the change in institutional ownership. In the first column the regression  
results are based on the sub-sample where both target price revisions by star and non-star analysts are positive. The second 
column presents the results for the sub-sample where both target price revisions by star and non-star analysts are negative. 
The regression corrects for selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratio computed using the estimated probabilities 
for each observation from the duration model in table 5. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level to 
correct for cross-sectional dependence. Table 1 gives variables definitions.  








Coef. Hazard rates 
TPerr 0.314*** 1.369*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
EPSerr −0.713*** 0.490*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Tpbold −0.164*** 0.849*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] 
RECret −0.002** 0.998** 
 
[0.016] [0.016] 
LFR 0.057*** 1.059*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Exp −0.135*** 0.873*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Nfirms 0.075 1.078 
 
[0.454] [0.454] 
Freq −0.173*** 0.842*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
StarBank −0.384*** 0.681*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
inst −0.157 0.854 
 
[0.166] [0.166] 
Wald χ2 228.16 
Prob  > χ2 0.000 
N 90,702 
Notes: This table reports estimates of a duration model of the determinants of analysts star 
rating events. XSTAR is an event of a star analyst losing their star ranking. The table 
estimates the duration model for the likelihood of an XSTAR event. The table reports both 
coefficients and the hazard ratios. Variables definitions are provided in table 1.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
 
